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IN THE .SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
NELLIE· A. LOVET·T, 
Plaintiff arnd Resp,o1Z1dent, 
-vs.-
THE CON·TINENTAL BANK AND 
TRUST C.OMP ANY, a corporation, 
Executor of the Estate of Mrs. J. U. 
Giesy, also lmown as Juliet Galena 
Giesy, Deceased, 
Defendamt and App-ellant. 
BRIE·F OF RES.PONDE:NT 
STATEMENT ·OF' FAC·T·S 
Civil 
No. 8199 
Mrs. J. U. Giesy, also known as Juliet ·Galena Giesy, 
died testate on the 17th day of March, 1953, (R.104, 105). 
She left an estate of the appraised value of approxi-
mately $60,000.00 (R. 103, 104). Under the terms of 
Mrs. Giesy's will a cousin named Boyd Guthrie and his 
wife, Anona Guthrie, of Rifle, Colorado, were named as 
residuary legatees, and Anona Guthrie was named as 
legatee of Mrs. Giesy's jewelry with the exception of one 
diamond bracelet bequeathed to an Olive Taylor (Ex. 
21, R. 137, 138). The will was executed on the 21st day 
of February, 1951, (R. 143). The Continental Bank and 
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Trost Company was 'appointed executor of the will (R.l, 
5). 
Mrs. Nellie A. Lovett, plaintiff and respondent, com-
menced this action against the Continental Bank and 
T'rust Company, defendant and ap·pellant, as such ex·e-
cutor. Respondent's complaint consisted of two causes 
of action (R. 1, 2). 
In her first cause of action Mrs. Lovett sought the 
recovery of certain items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11) in the 
possession of the defendant executor. Mrs. Giesy had 
given these items of jew·elry to Mrs. Lovett shortly prior 
to Mrs. Giesy's death, infra p·. 11 et seq. After Mrs. 
Giesy's death, Mrs. Lovett had, pursuant to an agree-
ment between her then attorney, Mr. Edward M. Mor-
rissey, and the executor bank, turned these items of 
jewelry over to the executor for safekeeping pending the 
disposition of this matter, infra p. 15, et seq. 
Mrs. Lovett's second cause of action consisted of two 
counts .. ·The first count was in quantum meruit for re-
covery of the reasonable value of certain services per-
formed by Mrs. Lovett for Mrs. Giesy between the first 
day of June, 1950, and the 16th day of March, 1953, at 
Mrs. Giesy's special instance and request, which ser-
vices were alleged to be of the reasonable value of $3,-
300.00. The second count was on an express contract of 
Mrs. Giesy to pay Mrs. Lovett $3,300.00 for said ser-
vices. Both counts were alleged in one paragraph (R. 2). 
The defendant executor counterclaimed for the re-
covery of a large diamond ring (Ex. 1) in the possession 
of Mrs. Lovett (R. 6). l\frs. Giesy had given this ring 
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to Mrs. Lovett in November of 1952, approximately 
four months prior to Mrs. Giesy 's death, infra p. 10 et 
seq. It was not turned over to the executor for safekeep-
ing with the je,welry described in respondent's first cause 
of action, iJnfra p. 16 ·et seq. 
The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the re-
spondent and against the executor on the respondent's 
first cause of action for the recovery of the items of 
jewelry described therein (R. 186) and a verdict in favor 
of the respondent and against the executor on respond-
ent's second cause of action for the recovery of the rea-
sonable value of respondent's services in the amount of 
$3,300.00 (R.187) and a verdict in favor of the respondent 
and against the executor on the executor's counterclaim 
for the recovery of the large diamond ring (R. 188). 
Judgment was entered in favor of the respondent on each 
of the verdicts (R. 183-185), and the executor's motions 
for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the verdicts 
were denied (R. 197). The defendant executor appeals. 
POINTS, AR,GUED BY RESPONDENT 
1. THE EVID,ENCE VI AS SUF'FICIENT TO 
SUPPORT 'l1HE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN 
FA V·OR OF RESPONDENT ON R,ES,PO,NDENT'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR. THin REC'OVER.Y 
OF THE ITEMS OF JEWEI_jRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT 
EX. 6) THAT WERE TI-IE SUBJECT' MATTER 
THEREOF·. 
2. THE EVIDENCE WAS SUF'FICIEN'T 'TO 
8UPPOR,T THE VER,DICT OF THE JUR,Y IN 
FAVOR OF RESP·ONDENT ON R,ES,PONDENT'S 
SECOND· CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR. THE RECOVERY 
OF T'HE REASONABI__JE V Alj1TE OF: R,ES,POND-
ENT'S SERVICES. 
1. Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to 
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support a re~covery on an express p-romise of 
the decedent to pay respondent the sp·ecific sum 
of $3,300.00 was immaterial. 
2. The evidence 'vas 'Sufficient to sup·port the ver-
dict of the jury in favor of respondent for the 
recovery on an implied promise of the reason-
able value of respondent's services rendered at 
decedent's special instance and request. 
3. THE IN~STR.UC·TIO·NS. AS GIVEN DID NO·T 
PLACE THE BURDE.N ON APPELLANT ·OF. NEGA-
TIVING A GIF'T· OF' THE LARGE DIAMOND RING 
(E,X. 1) THAT WAS. THE SUBJECT OF. APPEL-
LANT''S CO'UNTER.CLAIM. THE INSTRUC·TIONS 
DID NO·T PREJUDICE APPELLANT. 
4. THE INSTRUCTI'ONS AS GIVE.N WER.E 
NOT· A MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW PERTAIN-
ING TO DE.LIVERY OF THE GIF'T OF JEWELRY 
(EXS .. 3-11, EXCEPT EX. 6) T'HAT WAS· THE SUB-
JECT O·F' RES.P·ONDENT'S FIRST CAUSE· OF AC-
TION. THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICE 
APPELLANT·. 
STATE,MENT OF EVIDENCE 
We do not agree with app·ellant's statem·ent of facts. 
1. E.VIDENCE IN SUPPOR:T OF R.ECOVERY 
OF REASONABLE VALUE OF RE'SPONDEN·T'S 
S·ERVICES. 
At the outset it is to be noted that appellant claims 
that the evidence was not sufficient to sup·port the verdict 
of the jury in favor of respondent on resp·ondent's second 
cause of action for the recovery on an implied contract of 
the reasonable value of respondent's services rendered 
to the decedent at the decedent's sp~ecial instance and 
request. (Appellant's brief pp. 17-22.) The evidence in 
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In May of 19·50 the circumstances of the parties were 
as follows. Mrs. Giesy was 73 years of age. She was 
frail and required a great deal of attention (R. 26, 73). 
She was the widow of Dr. J. U. Giesy, a former practic-
ing physician in Salt Lake City, Utah, who had died in 
approximately 1945 (R. 25,115, 125). She had no children 
and no brothers or sisters (R. 25). Her only relatives 
were an aunt named JUliet Guthrie and a cousin named 
Boyd Guthrie and his wife, Anona Guthrie, all of whom 
lived in Rifle, Colorado (R. 25). She lived alone in the 
Maryland Apartments on East South Temple Street in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, (R. 2·5). She occupied a large 
apartment consisting of a living room, dining room, bed-
room, bathroom, kitchen and a long connecting hall (R. 
71). Up to May of 1950 she had employed a Mrs. Gaynor 
(Ganger R. 56) to take care of her (R. 56). Mrs. Ganger 
quit working for l\!rs. Giesy in May of 1950 (R. 26). 
Mrs. Giesy had previously become acquainted with the 
respondent, Mrs. Lovett, through Mrs. Ganger (R. 56). 
Mrs. Lovett is the wife of Mr. Harry D. Lovett. Mr. 
Lovett has been employed as an accountant for the Utah 
Power & Light Company for the past 31 years (R. 24). 
In May of 1950 Mrs. Giesy called Mrs. Lovett on the 
telephone and asked her to corne to Mrs. Giesy's apart-
ment because she wanted to talk to her (R. 25). Mrs. 
Lovett and her husband, Mr. Harry D. Lovett, went to 
Mrs. Giesy's apartment in response to the telephone call. 
Mrs. Giesy had the following conversation with Mrs. 
Lovett in the presence of Mr. Lovett. Mrs. Giesy told 
Mrs. Lovett that Mrs. Ganger had quit working for her. 
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She asked Mrs. Lovett if Mrs. Lovett would take over 
Mrs. Ganger's work and do Mrs. Giesy's housework and 
beauty work. 'She told Mrs. Lovett that the beauty work 
would consist of washing and tinting her hair, giving her 
a facial, and doing her nails every Saturday and gen-
erally taking care of her hair and personal appearance 
throughout the week. Mrs. Lovett replied that she would. 
Mrs. Giesy then said, "I don't want you to he concerned 
about the pay, because you will be well paid for your 
services." (R. 26, 27.) 
Thereaf-ter, Mrs. Lovett corrrmenced working for 
Mrs. Giesy on approximately June 1, 1950, (R. 27). Mrs. 
Lovett went to Mrs. Giesy's apartment daily (R. 29). 
She p·repared Mrs. Giesy's meals, washed the dishes, pol-
ished the floors, dusted the furniture, washed the win-
dows, hung the curtains and did the general housework 
(R. 28, 61, 70, 71). Each Saturday she washed and tinted 
Mrs. ·Giesy's hair, gave her a facial and manicured her 
nails. (R. 28). 
Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital for two weeks during 
the month of June, 19·50, (R. 29). When Mrs. Giesy was 
released from the hospital, on the advice of her doctor, 
slie e·mployed a Mrs. Alene Douglas to work five days a 
week and to stay with her at night for approximately 
one month until August 1, 1950, (R. 29, 30). During the 
p·eriod that Mrs. Douglas was there, Mrs. Lovett con-
tinued to work for Mrs. Giesy and did the same work 
that she had previously done (R. 30, 31). 
Mrs. Douglas quit on approximately August 1, 19'50, 
(R. 31). At that time Mrs. Giesy had the following con-
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versation with Mrs. Lovett in the presence of Mr. Lovett 
and Mrs. D·ouglas. Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett that Mrs. 
Douglas was quitting and asked Mrs. Lovett if she would 
continue on with her work. Mrs. Lovett said she would. 
Mrs. Giesy also asked Mrs. Lovett to accompany her 
when she went downtown because her doctor (Dr. David 
E. ·Smith, R. 116) had advised her that she could not go 
downtown alone. She also asked Mrs. Lovett to stay with 
her at night. (R. 31, 32.) 
During the twenty-six month period from August 1, 
1950, to October 1, 1952, Mrs. Lovett did the following 
work for Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Lovett continued to do Mrs. 
Giesy's general housework, prepare her meals, do the 
dishes and do Mrs. Giesy's beauty work (R. 33-35, 61, 69-
71.) Mrs. Lovett took Mrs. Giesy to her doctor two or 
three times a week. She went back and stayed with Mrs. 
Giesy at night for two or three hours each night (R. 32, 
60.) During this period Mrs. Lovett spent an average of 
n1ore than six hours a day at Mrs. Giesy's apartment and 
two or three hours at night ( R. 34). On several occasions 
during this period Mrs. Giesy told Mr. Frank J. Nelson, 
a lifetime acquaintance of Mrs. Giesy's and disinterested 
witness, of the work Mrs. Lovett was doing for her and 
in particular that Mrs. Lovett was doing her housework, 
preparing her meals, doing her beauty work and taking 
care of her business ( R. 92-93). Mrs. Giesy, on many 
occasions during this period, told Mrs. Lovett that she 
need not be concerned about her pay; and, that she would 
be well paid for her services (R. 35). During this entire 
twenty-six month period Mrs. Giesy employed no other 
help, with the exception of a negro woman who worked 
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for her ·a total of three days (R. 35). 
Mrs. Giesy went to the hospital on Octobe·r 1, 1952. 
She was in the hospital until ap·proximately November 
15, 195·2, as a result of a serious skin ailment on her face, 
neck and ears. (R. 35, 36.) During this period ¥rs. Lovett ,A 
j, t: It: S y :S /'• 
did the following work. She did Mrs.' neauty work and 
shop·ping. She laundered Mrs. Giesy's clothes daily. Mrs. 
Lovett, on ·advice of Mrs. Giesy's doctor, was required to 
disinfect her hands with lysol each time she handled Mrs. 
Giesy's clothes. She also took care of all of Mrs. Giesy's 
correspondence, which consisted of reading Mrs. Giesy's 
mail to her, writing for her and writing her checks, be-
cause the skin diseas-e prevented Mrs. Giesy from wearing 
I do yJ/, her spectacles and ·she could not see to the work. Mrs. 
Lovett stayed with Mrs. Giesy at the hospital at night 
when she was not covered by a special nurse. See testi-
mony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett (R. 36-37, 66) and testi-
mony of Mayme C. Garrison, Mrs. Giesy's nurse, (R. 
9·6-, 100). 
Mrs. Giesy· was released from the hospital in ap-
proximately the middle of November, 1952, (R. 38). Dur-
mg the period from November 15, 1952, to March 15, 
1953, Mrs. Lovett continued to work for Mrs. Giesy. She 
did the following work. She prepared Mrs. Giesy's meals, 
did her beauty work and did general housework such as 
washing the floors and dusting. She took Mrs. Giesy to 
the doctor because Mrs. Giesy could not go alone. She 
took care of Mrs. Giesy's correspondence, wrote her let-
ters, _took care of Mrs. Giesy's bills and wrote her checks 
because Mrs. Giesy was having difficulty with her eyes. 
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She relieved a practical nurse at night. She worked for 
Mrs. Giesy an average of five or six hours a day. See 
testimony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett (R. 39-40) and testi-
mony of Mrs. Kathryn Maddocks (R. 76-78, 86-87). Dur-
ing this period Mrs. Giesy had the following additional 
help. A Mrs. Haig and a night nurse were employed to 
stay with Mrs. Giesy for approximately one month after 
Mrs. Giesy was discharged from the hospital. Mrs. Haig 
and the night nurse were released in the middle of De-
cember, 1952, (R. 38, 29). Thereafter a Mrs. Kathryn 
Maddocks was employed as a practical nurse for Mrs. 
Giesy until March 15, 19·53, (R. 38, 39, 75). On March 15, 
19·53, Mrs. Giesy again went to the hospital (R. 75, 76). 
She died on March 17, 1953, (R. 97, 98, 104, 105). 
Mrs. Lovett worked for Mrs. Giesy a total of 33 
months. She worked every day. She worked an average 
of in excess of six hours per day. (R. 41, 77, 78.) Mrs. 
l\faddocks testified that the reasonable value of, and 
ordinary charge for, services such as those performed by 
Mrs .. Lovett for Mrs. Giesy throughout the entire period, 
was $1.25 to $1.50 an hour (R. 78). 
Mrs. Giesy repeatedly told Mrs. Lovett not to be 
concerned about her pay; and, that she would he well paid 
for her services. See testimony of Mr. Harry D. Lovett 
(R. 27, B5, 41) and corroborating testimony of Mrs. 
Maddocks (R. 78) and Mr. Frank J. Nelson (R. 9·4, 95). 
Mrs. Lovett's second cause of action was submitted 
to the jury under instructions that the jury must find by 
a preponderance of the evidence: that Mrs. Lovett per-
formed services for Mrs. Giesy at Mrs. Giesy's request; 
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that it was contemplated by Mrs. Giesy ·and Mrs. Lovett 
that Mrs. Giesy would pay Mrs. Lovett for such services; 
that Mrs. Giesy did not pay Mrs. Lovett for such serv-
ices; and, that in determining the reasonable value of 
such services the jury might consider the nature of the 
services, the length of time required to perform the serv-
ices and the relationship· between the p:arties. See In-
struction No. 3 (R. 168), Instructi·on No.7 (R. 173), In-
struction No. 10 (R. 176) and Instruction No.11 (R.177). 
The jury returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Lovett on 
her s-econd cause of action in the amount of $3,300.00 (R. 
187). We submit that the verdict was amply sup·ported 
by a p·reponderance of the evidence. 
2. EVIDENCE IN SUPPO·RT· OF' GIFT TORE-
S:PONDE.NT O·F DIAMOND· RING (EX. 1). 
The evidence in support of the verdict of the jury 
in favor of the respondent and against the appellant on 
appellant's counterclaim for recovery of the large dia-
mond ring (Ex. 1, R. 41, 4·2, 45) was as follows. Mrs. 
Giesy purchased the large diamond ring from Daynes 
Jewelry Company in December of 1950 (R. 4·2, 89, 90). 
·On the day that Mrs. Giesy purcha;sed the ring, Mr. 
Lovett took Mrs. Giesy and Mrs. Lovett home to Mrs. 
Giesy's apartment. Mrs. Giesy showed the ring to Mr. 
Lovett in Mrs. Lovett's presence and said, "This ring is 
to be your wife's. I bought it for her." (R. 42, 43.) 
In March of 1952, approximately a year p·rior to Mrs. 
Giesy's death, she told Mr. Alex P. Anderson, the man-
ager of Daynes J'ewelry Company, that she was going to 
give the large diamond ring to Mrs. Lovett (R .. 89-91). 
10 
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In November of 1952, after Mrs. Giesy was released 
from the hospital, she gave the ring to Mrs. Lovett in 
Mr. Lovett's presence under the following circumstances. 
Mrs. Giesy said to Mrs. Lovett that the ring was getting 
too large for her and she could not wear it any more. She 
then said, ''I've given it to you, so now I want you to have 
it." Thereupon she handed the ring to Mrs. Lovett in an 
envelope (Ex. 2) inscribed, "To My' Witto' Nell-Galena". 
(R. 43-46.) The large diamond ring has been in Mrs. 
Lovett's possession ever since that occurrence (R. 44). 
Appellant offered no evidence in support of its 
counterclaim for the recovery of the large diamond ring, 
and the testimony of appellant's own witness, Dr. David 
E. Smith, was that Mrs. Giesy had given the ring to Mrs. 
Lovett (R. 119-120). We submit that the evidence is con-
clusive that Mrs. Giesy gave Mrs. Lovett the large dia-
mond ring and that as a matter of law Mrs. Lovett is en-
titled to the ring as against appellant's counterclaim. 
3. EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF GIFT TO RE-
SPONDENT OF JEWELRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT EX. 
6). 
Appellant clai1ns that the evidence was not sufficient 
to support the verdict of the jury in favor of respondent 
on respondent's first cause of action for recovery of the 
items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11, with the exception of Ex. 6) 
that were the subject matter thereof. (Appellant's brief, 
pp. 9-13.) The evidence in support of respondent's first 
cause of action was as follows. 
Mrs. Giesy executed her last will and testament on 
the 21st day of F'ebruary, 1951, (R. 143). Under the terms 
11 
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of the will, Anona Guthrie, the wife of Mrs. Giesy's 
cousin, Boyd Guthrie, was named as legatee of Mrs. 
Giesy's jewelry with the exception of one diamond brace-
let bequeathed to an Olive Taylor. (Ex. 21, R. 137, 138.) 
When Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital in October of 
1952, she had a conversation with Mrs. Lovett in the 
presence of Mr. Lovett with reference to her jewelry in 
which she said that Dr. Smith had made arrangements 
with the sup:erintendent of the hospital to p·ut her jewelry 
..... --:?> in the hosp·ital t7~ault. She then told Mrs. Lo;vett that Dr. 
'Smith might/well have turned it over to Mrs. Lovett, 
because she was going to have it anyway. She then said, 
" * * * because Anona will never wear any of my 
jewelry." (R. 46.) 
Miss Mayme C. Garrison attended Mrs. Giesy as a 
special nurse while Mrs. Giesy was in the hospital in 
October of 1952 (R. 96). Mrs. Giesy at that time told 
Miss Garrison that, "She wanted Mrs. Lovett to have 
her jewelry," ·and that the Guthries had had all of her es-
tate that they would get (R. 97). Mrs. Giesy also told Mr. 
Frank Jl. Nelson in a conversation concerning h·er will 
that the Guthries would receive nothing from her (R. 
94). The latter conversation occurred in March of 1952, 
ap·proximately a year prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R. 
93). 
On Friday, March 13, 1953, Mrs. Kathryn Maddocks 
was attending Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Giesy became very seri-
ously ill. She continued to get worse until Sunday morn-
ing, March 15, 1953. On S·unday morning Dr. Smith came 
to Mrs. Giesy's apartment. (R. 79, 117.) Mrs. Maddocks 
12 
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testified that at that time Dr. Smith and Mrs. Giesy had 
the following conversation in her presence. Dr. Smith 
told Mrs. Giesy that she would have to go to the hospital. 
Dr. Smith then asked Mrs. Giesy what she wanted done 
with her jewels while she was ill. Mrs. Giesy replied, "I 
want Nell to have them, they are hers.'' Mrs. Giesy then 
handed her jewel box (Ex. 12, R. 81) to Mrs. Maddocks 
and said, "These are for Nell, give them to Nell.'' (R. 79, 
80, 83.) The jewel box contained Mrs. Giesy's jewelry 
(Exs. 3-11, except Ex. 6). (R .. 49, 50.) Dr. Smith then 
left for the hospital (R. 79, 80, 118). He had previously 
called an ambulance for Mrs. Giesy (R. 118). 
Thereafter the ambulance came, and Mrs. Giesy told 
Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hospital with the 
jewels. Mrs. Maddocks had a blowout in the driveway of 
the apartment. (R. 80.) She went back to the apartment 
and called the Lovetts and told them what had happened. 
The Lovetts said they would com·e and take her to the 
hospital. (R. 48, 80.) When the Lovetts arrived at the 
apartment, Mrs. ~1:addocks handed the jewel box to Mrs. 
Lovett and said, "11rs. Giesy said you were to have these 
jevvels." (R. 80.) 
Mr. Lo;vett then drove Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Mad-
docks to the hospital (R. 49, 81). Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. 
Maddocks went to Mrs. Giesy's room. While they were 
there, Mrs. Lovett asked Mrs. Giesy whether she should 
turn the jewels over to the Continental Bank. Mrs. Giesy 
replied, "No, those jewels are yours, Nell." (R .. 81, 84.) 
Mr. Lovett took Mrs. Lovett and Mrs. Maddocks home. 
(R. 50, 81.) 
13 
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That evening Mr. and Mrs. Lovett returned to the 
hospital and visited Mrs. Giesy. Mrs. Lovett again asked 
Mrs. Giesy whether or not she wante-d Mrs. Lo¥ett to turn 
the jHwelry that Mrs. Maddocks had delivered to her over 
to the executor of Mrs. Giesy's estate. Mrs. Giesy replied, 
''No, the vultures will be after my things soon enough. 
I want you to have them." (R. 51, 52.) 
Thereafter Mr. Lovett placed the jewelry in his safe 
deposit box in the Walker Bank and Trust Company (R. 
52). 
Mrs. Giesy wore her diamond earrings (Ex. 6) to the 
hospital (R. 98, 99). On Tuesday morning, March 17, 
1953, Miss Mayme C. Garrison, Mrs. Giesy's nurse, tele-
p,honed the Lovetts and told th.em that Mrs. Giesy was 
dying. (R. 52, 98.) About twenty minutes later Dr. Srnith 
calle-d and told the L·ovetts that Mrs. Giesy was dead (R. 
52). They both asked ~fr. and Mrs. Lovett to hurry up 
to the ho'Spital (R. 52, 53). Mr. and Mrs. Lovett went 
to the hospital and met Miss Garrison at Mrs. Giesy's 
room. (R. 53). Miss Garrison told Mrs. Lovett that Mrs. 
Giesy said Mrs. Lovett was to have her jewelry and then 
asked Mrs. Lovett if she would care to remove Mrs. 
Giesy's earrings from her. Mrs. Lovett replied that she 
would not and asked Miss Garrison to do so. Miss Gar-
rison then removed the earrings and handed them to Mrs. 
Lovett. (R. 99.) At the close of respondent's evidence 
respondent's counsel agreed that respondent's first 
cause of action so far as it pertained to the earrings (Ex. 
6) be di'smiss,ed because respondent's evidence affirma-
tively showed that the earrings were not delivered to 
respondent prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R. 114). 
14 
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The apprtaised value in probate of all of the jewelry 
involved in this case·, including the large diamond ring, 
was $5,000.00. The retail value of all of the jewelry, in-
cluding the large diamond ring, was $7 ,000.00. ( R. 104.) 
In March of 1953, at the inception of the dispute in-
volved in this matter, Mrs. Lovett employed Mr. Edward 
M. Morrissey, a member of the Utah State Bar, to repre-
sent her (R. 107, 108). Thereafter Mr. Morrissey had a 
conversation with Mr. W. L. O'Meara, the trust officer of 
the Continental Bank and T'rust Company, with refer-
ence to the jewelry involved in this action. They both 
expressed the view that they did not want a lawsuit and, 
in order to avoid difficulties, agreed to the following: 
tliat Mr. O·'Meara would make formal demand on lVlrs. 
Lovett through 1\tfr. Morrissey for return of the jewelry; 
that on receipt of the demand Mr. Morrissey would advise 
Mrs. Lovett to deposit the jewelry with the executor bank 
for safekeeping only; and, that in so doing Mrs. Lovett 
vvould not be relinquishing any right or waiving any claim 
that she might have to the jewelry and she would not be 
admitting anything with reference to her claim to the 
jewelry. See testirnony of Mr. Edward M. Morrissey 
(R. 108-111) and testimony of Mr. W. L. O'Meara (R. 
135-136). Thereafter 1fr. O'JYleara, by letter dated ApTil 
3, 1953, (Ex. 15) made demand on 1\irs. Lovett through 
Mr. Morrissey for ·each of the items of jeweiry described 
in respondent's first cause of action (Exs. 3-11, R. 1) and 
for the large diamond ring (Ex. 1, R. 6) described in 
appellant's counterclaim (R. 108, 113). 
Upon receipt of the letter from Mr. O'M·ea.ra, Mr. 
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Morrissey had the following conversation with Mrs. 
Lovett. H·e told Mrs. Lovett of his conversation with Mr. 
O'Meara and advised Mrs. Lovett th·at she should turn 
over all of the jewelry, except the large diamond ring, 
to the executor for safekeeping pursuant to his agreement 
with Mr. O'Meara to the effect tHat in so doing she 
would not be relinquishing any of her rights to the jewel-
ry and that it would he deposited with the hank for safe-
keeping only pending disp-osition of this matter. With 
reference to the large diamond ring, Mr. Morrissey ad-
vised Mrs. Lovett that, under the circumstanees she re-
late·d to him, she should not turn it over to the bank be-
cause it was his opinion that neither the heirs nor any-
one ·else would make any claim to it (R. 110-112). There-
after on April 7, 1953, Mrs. Lovett, pursuant to Mr. 
Morrissey's recommendation, delivered all of the items 
of jewelry (Exs. 3-11) to the executor bank, with excep-
tion of the large diamond ring (Ex. 1), and obtained a 
receipt for the same (Ex.16, R.111, 113). 
As a part of respondent's case Mrs. Lovett was called 
as a witness to testify in her own behalf, not as to her 
transactions with decedent or as to any matters equally 
within hers and decedent's knowledge, but only with 
regard to the circumstances connected with her turning 
the jewelry over to the bank after deeedent'·s death. Ap-
p·ellant objected that, since Mrs. Lovett was a party to 
an action against th·e executor of a decedent's estate, the 
dead man's statute, ·section 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, made 
her incompetent to testify as a witness regardless of 
whether or not her testimony related to transactions with 
the decedent or matters equally within hers and the de-
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cedent's knowledge. The trial court sustained appellant's 
objection and refused to permit Mrs. Lovett to testify 
to the circumstances connected with her turning the 
jewelry over to the bank after decedent's death. (R. 105.) 
R.espondent's first cause of action for recovery of 
the items of jewelry (Exs. 3-11, except Ex. 6) and appel-
lant's counterclaim for recovery of the large diamond 
ring (Ex. 1) were both submitted to the jury under in-
structions that the burden was on respondent to prove 
each of the elements of a gift of each of the items of 
jewelry involved in this case~ by clear and convincing evi-
dence. See Instruction No. 6A (R. 172) and Instruction 
No. 9 (R. 175). The jury returned a verdict in favor of 
respondent on her first cause of action for recovery of 
the items of jewelry that were the subject matter thereof 
and a verdict in favor of respondent and ~against appel-
lant on appellant's counterclaim for the large diamond 
ring (R. 186, 188). We submit that the verdicts were 
amply supported by the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE E.VIDENCE W A'S SUF'FICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN 
F AV·OR OF RESPONDENT ON R.ES.PONDENT'S 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR THE RECOVERY 
OF THE ITEM'S OF JEWELRY (EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT 
EX. 6) THA·T WERE THE SUB~JECT· MATTER. 
THEREOF·. 
At the outset appellant sets forth the rule that the 
burden is on one who claims title to personal property 
by gift to prove all of the elements of a gift including 
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the intention of the donor by clear and convincing evi-
dence. (App·ellant's brief, pp. 9-11, citing Jones v. Cook, 
118 U. 562, 223 P. 2d 423, 1950.) Appellant than purports 
to quote certain testimony from the record and from that 
testimony argues that the facts in the case before this 
court are not clear and convincing to the effect that Mrs. 
Giesy gave the items of jewelry that were the subject 
of respondent's first cause of action (Exs. 3-11, except 
Ex. 6) to Mrs. Lovett and, therefore, the verdict of the 
jury on respondent's first cause of action should be set 
aside. ( Ap·pellant's brief, pp. 12, 13.) 
Ap·pellant''S conclusion is not correct. The trial court 
instructed the jury that the burden was on respondent to 
prove each of the elements of a. gift of the jewelry in-
volved in this case by clear and convincing evidence, and 
that the intention of the donor to make a gift must be 
shown by the evidence to he clear and unmistakable, In-
struction No. 6A (R. 172) and Instruction No.9 (R. 175). 
We submit that tlie evidence was clear and convincing 
that Mrs. Giesy gave respondent the jewelry (Exs. 3-11, 
except Ex. 6) that was the subject of respondent's first 
cause of action, and that in any event there was substan-
tial evidence to support the verdict of the jury. 
Respondent's e·vidence was as follows. After Mrs. 
Giesy executed her will in F'ebruary of 19·51, (R. 143) she 
repeatedly stated 'that she was going to give her jewelry 
to Mrs. Lovett and th·at the Guthries had had all of her 
estate that they would get. See testimony of Mr. Lovett 
(R. 46), Miss Mayme C. Garrison (R. 96, 97) and Mr. 
Flrank J. N·elson (R. 94). On March 15, 1953, when Dr. 
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Smith told Mrs. Giesy that she would have to go to the 
hospital and asked her what she wanted done with her 
jewels, Mrs. Giesy replied, ''I want Nell to have them, 
they are hers." Mrs. Giesy then handed her jewel box to 
Mrs. Maddocks and said, "These are for Nell, give them 
to Nell." (R. 79, 80, 83). Thereafter Dr. Smith left for 
the hospital (R. 79, 80, 118). When the ambulance came, 
Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hos-
pital with the jewels, but due to difficulty with her auto-
mobile Mrs. Maddocks was unable to do so (R. 80). Mrs. 
Maddocks called the Lovetts and told them what had 
happened, and the Lovetts said that they would come and 
take her to the hospital. (R. 48, 80.) When the Lovetts 
arrived at the apartment, Mrs. Maddocks handed the 
jewel bo:x to Mrs. Lovett and said, "1'Irs. Giesy said you 
were to have these jewels." ( R. 80) . '11hereafter on two 
occasions Mrs. Lovett asked Mrs. Giesy at the hospital 
whether or not Mrs. Giesy wanted Mrs. Lovett to turn the 
jevvels that Mrs. ~1addocks had delivered to her over to 
the executor. Mrs. Giesy replied, "No, those jewels are 
yours, Nell," (R. 81, 84) and "No, the vultures will be 
after my things soon enough, I ·w-ant you to have them." 
( R. 51, 52.) Supra., p. 11 et seq. 
Furthermore the inferences dravvn by appellant from 
the record are not correct. 
1. Appellant claims that the fact that Mrs. Giesy 
directed Mrs. Maddocks to follow the ambulance to the 
hospital with the jewelry evidenced a clear intention on 
the part of Mrs. Giesy to retain dominion and control 
over the jewelry, appellant's brief, p. 12. Mrs. Giesy's 
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direction to Mrs. Maddocks to follow her to the hospital 
with the jewels was not inconsistent with her direction 
to Mrs. Maddocks to give the jewels to Mrs. Lovett. Fol-
lowing that occurrence Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett at the 
hospital on two occasi~ons, in response to a question as 
to whether or not Mrs. Lovett should turn the jewelry 
over to the executor, that Mrs. Lovett should not do so, 
that the jewels belonged to Mrs. Lovett and that she 
wanted Mrs. Lovett to have them. The other testimony 
detailed above evidences a clear intention on the part of 
Mrs. Giesy to give the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett. 
2. Appellant asserts that 1\irs. Giesy told Dr. Smith 
that she would have Mrs. Lovett take_ charge of her jewel-
ry while she was in the hospital, appellant's brief, p. 12. 
D-r. Smith so testified (R. 117). From this testimony ap-
pellant infers that Mrs. Giesy did not intend to give the 
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, ibid. p. 12. Mrs. Maddocks testi-
fied that Mrs. Giesy told Dr. Smith, ''I want Nell to have 
them, they are hers,'' and then handed her jewel hox to 
Mrs. Maddocks and said, "These are for Nell, give them 
to Nell." The othe-r testimony detailed above is directly 
in conflict with that of Dr. Smith on this issue and evi-
dences a clear intention on the part of Mrs. Giesy to give 
the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett. 
3. Appellant asserts that the verdict of the jury 
is not supported by clear and convincing evidence th.at 
Mrs. Giesy did give Mrs. Lovett the jewelry because Mrs. 
Lovett did not take the witness stand to rebut the testi-
mony of Dr. Smith, Mr. O'Meara and Mr. D. A. Skeen 
t~o the effect that Mrs. Lovett did not tell them that Mrs. 
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Giesy gave her the jewelry in certain conversations con-
cerning turning the jewelry over to the executor, ap-
pellant's brief, pp. 12-13. We submit that that above con-
clusion is not correct and that no such inference can be 
drawn from the record. 
a. Mrs. Lovett took the witness stand as a part of 
her own case to testify to the, circumstances following 
Mrs. Giesy's death connected with her turning the jewel-
ry over to the executor bank. Appellant objected that 
the dead man's statute, Sec. 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, made 
Mrs. Lovett incompetent to testify as a witness regard-
less of the fact that her proffered testimony pertained 
to matters that occurred after Mrs. Gjesy's death and not 
to ·any transactions with the decedent or matters equally 
within hers and the decedent's knowledge. The trial 
court sustained appellant's objection and refused to per-
mit Mrs. Lovett to testify to the circumstances connected 
with turning the jewelry over to the executor. (R .. 105.) 
Supra, p. 16, et seq. Section 78-24-2, U.C.A., 1953, makes 
a party to an action against an executor incompetent to 
testify only as to transactions with the decedent and mat-
ters equally within the party's and the decedent's knowl-
edge. 
b. Furthermore, the testimony of Dr. Smith, Mr. 
O'Meara and Mr. Skeen was so conflicting and so irrecon-
cilable with the basic facts of the case that it was ap-
parent that these winesses were testifying to their pres-
ent impressions of a past event and not to what they ac-
tually saw and heard. Respondent's counsel, therefore, 
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determined that it was not necessary to call Mrs. Lovett 
in rebuttal. 
Dr. Smith testified that, when Mrs. Giesy arrived at 
the hospital, Mrs. Giesy explained to him that she was 
late because she waited until Mrs. Lovett came to the 
apartment and that she then turned the jewelry over to 
Mrs. Lovett herself (R. 118, 123, 124). Mr. Skeen testi-
fied that Mrs. Lovett told him that, when Mrs. Giesy 
left for the ho:spital, Mrs. Lo~ett put the j·ewelry in the 
jewel box and took it herself (R. 139, 144). The actual 
facts, as testified to by Mrs. Maddocks who was present 
at the time, were as follows. Mrs. Giesy handed the jewel 
box to Mrs. Maddocks with directions to give the jewels 
to Mrs. Lovett. After Mrs. Giesy left for the hospital, 
Mrs. Maddocks attempted to follow the ambulance. She 
had a mrshap· with her automobile and called the Lovetts. 
W:hen Mrs. Lovett arrived at the apartment, Mrs. 1\Iad-
·docks handed the jewel box to Mrs. Lovett and said, 
"Mrs. Giesy said you were to have these jewels." (R. 
79, 80, 82, 83.) 
Mr. O'Meara testified that in the c'Onference in Mr. 
Sk·een's office Mts. Lovett said that she would not turn 
the large diamond ring (Ex. 1) over to the executor be-
cause it had been given to her (R. 131). Mr. Skeen testi-
fied th·at in the same conference Mrs. Lovett made no 
claim to any of the jewelry and in particular that she 
-did not claim ownership of the large diamond ring (R. 
144). 
c. Ap·p·ellant asserts that Mrs. Lovett told Mr. 
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O'Meara in the conference with Mr. Skeen that she had 
the jewelry for "safekeeping'', appellant's brief, p. 13. 
Mr. O'Meara's testimony vvas not to that effect. Mr. 
O'Meara testified that Mr·s. Lovett told him that she had 
the jewelry in her safety deposit box for the purpose of 
safekeeping and not that she was holding it for safe-
keeping. (R. 131.) 
d. Furthermore the record shows the following. 
Mrs. Giesy gave the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett on M~arch 15, 
1953. Mrs. Giesy died on March 17, 1953. In March of 
1953, Mrs. Lovett employed an attorney to represent her 
at the inception of the dispute involved in this matter 
(R .. 107, 108). Thereafter she deposited the jewelry with 
the executor bank for safekeeping only, and only on the 
condition that in so doing she was not relinquishing any 
of her rights, or waiving her cl~aim, or admitting any-
thing with reference to her clain1, to the jewelry. See 
testimony of ~1:r. Edward 1\f. Morrissey (R. 108-111) and 
testimony of Mr. vV. L. O'Meara (R. 135-136). Supra, p. 
15 et seq. r,rrs. Lovett did not deposit the large dia-
mond ring with the executor because her attorney advised 
her not to do so because it was his opinion that under the 
circumstances neither the heirs nor anyone else would 
make any claim to it (R. 111-112). The large diamond 
ring had been given to Mrs. Lovett in November of 1952, 
four months prior to Mrs. Giesy's death (R. 43-46). 
The decision in Jones v. Cook, 118 U. 562, 223 P. 2d 
423, appellant's brief, pp. 10-11, is to be distinguished 
on its facts and in principle from the case before this 
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court. In Jones v. Cook the plaintiffs, residuary legatees 
under the will of their father, sued the defendant ·executor 
for conversion of an automobile that belonged to the 
father during his lifetime. The defendant executor was 
also a son of the decedent. The defendant pleaded as 
defenses that the plaintiffs' action was barred by the 
statute of limitations and a decree in the probate proceed-
ings. The defendant claimed for the first time at trial 
that he acquired title to the automobile by gift from the 
decedent. ·The only evidence in support of the defendant's 
claim -of a gift was his wife'·s testimony to the effect that 
the decedent had given him the automobile a few weeks 
prior to decedent's death. ·The evidence showed that the 
automobile had remained in the possession of the deced-
ent and his wife most of the time after the alleged time 
of the gift, that the certificate of title was never endorsed 
by the decedent to the defendant and that the defendant 
did not claim that the decedent had given the automobile 
to him for over four years after the decedent's death. The 
trial court refused to find that the decedent had given 
the automobile to the defendant. The supreme court af-
firme·d the decision of the. trial court on that issue. 
The case before this court was submitted to the jury 
under instructions that the burden was on respondent to 
prove all the elements of a gift by clear and convincing 
evidence, and the jury found in favor of respondent. We 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS S·UF'FICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN 
FAVOR OF RESP·ONDENT ON R.ES.PONDENT'S 
SEC·OND· CAUSE OF ACTION F'OR THE RECOVERY 
OF T'HE REASONABLE VALUE OF R.ES·POND-
ENT'·s SERVICES. 
1. Whether or not the evidence was sufficient to 
support a re~covery on an express promise of 
the decedent to pay respondent the specific sum 
of $3,300.00 was immaterial. 
Paragraph No.4 of respondent's second cause of ac-
tion reads verbatim as follows: 
"4. That between th·e 1st day of June, 1950, and 
the 16th day of March, 1953, plaintiff rendered 
services to said deceased at said deceased'·s special 
instance and request of the reasonable value of 
$3,300.00. That said deeeased agreed to pay plain-
tiff the sum of $3,300.00 for said services." (R. 2) 
Appellant claims that respondent is limited on her 
second cause of action to recovery on an express promise 
of Mrs. Giesy to pay respondent the specific sum of $3,-
300.00. Appellant reaches this result by the following 
process of reasoning. ( 1) That the allegations in para-
graph 4 for reeovery in quantu1n 1neruit and for re-covery 
on the express promise are written in the conjunctive 
rather than the disjunctive. That, therefore, paragraph 
4 does not state a claim for recovery on two theories in 
the alternative. That the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
do not authorize this form of pleading. That as a result 
respondent is limited to recovery on an express prornise 
of Mrs. Giesy to pay the specific sum of $3,300.00 for 
services rendered. ( 2) That a fair reading of paragraph 
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4 leads to the conclusion that respondent was only seek-
ing to recover on an express promise of Mrs. Giesy to 
pay the specific sum of $3,300.00 because the allegations 
are written in the conjunctive rather than the disjunctive. 
That the appellant could not determine the exact nature 
of respondent's claim by taking her deposition or inter-
rogatories beeause employment of such procedure would 
have resulted in waiver of respondent's incompetency 
under the dead man's statute to testify at trial. That had 
appellant known that respondent was seeking to recover 
the reasonable value of resp·ondent's services performed 
at Mrs. Giesy's request, app.ellant would have employed 
discovery procedures regardless of waiver of respond-
ent's incompetency. That, therefore, appellant was mis-
led :and prejudiced in the preparation of its defense; and, 
as a result, respondent is limited to recovery on the ex-
press pro:mJse. (App·ellant's brief, pp. 14-17.) 
We submit that neither appellant's conclusion nor 
the premises on which it is based are correct. 
1. Paragraph 4 contains a statement of a claim for 
reeovery on two theories, the one in quantum meruit and 
the o:ther on an express contract. The allegations are in 
the disjunctive and not the conjunctive. The two counts 
are expressed in separate sentences, and they are set 
forth alternately. If appellant was possibly confused 
by absence of use of the word "or," appellant could have 
enlightened itself by a motion for more definite statement 
under Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which motion would probably have been denied because 
the pleading is clear on its face. 
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2. Appellant claims that it was misled. We do not 
know in what plainer language appellant could have been 
informed that respondent was seeking to recover the rea-
sonable value of her services performed at Mrs. Giesy's 
special instance and request than by the allegation, ''That 
between the 1st day of June, 1950, and the 16th day of 
March, 1953, plaintiff rendered services to said deceased 
at said deceased's special instance and request of the rea-
sonable value of $3,300.00." Furthermore appellant could 
have employed discovery procedures to determine the ex-
act nature of respondent's claim. The taking of the de-
position of an adverse party does not waive the right 
to object to the competency of the party's testimony at 
trial under the dead man's statute, Clayton v. Ogden 
State Bank, 82 U. 564, 26 P. 2d 545 (1933). 
3. Both theories of recovery are alleged 1n one 
count as authorized by Rule 8(e) (2) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, which reads as follows : 
"A party may set forth two or more statements 
of a claim * * * alternately or hypothetically, 
either in one count * * * or in separate counts 
* * *. When two or more statements are made in 
the alternative and one of them if made inde-
pendently would be sufficient, the pleading is not 
made insufficient by the insufficiency of one or 
more of the alternative staternents. A party may 
also state as many separate claims * * * a:s he has 
dl f "t ***" regar ess o cons1s ency . 
The decision in Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., (Utah, 
1953) 264 P. 2d 279, is not authority for appellant's prop-
osition. In the Taylor case the plaintiff declared on an ex-
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press contract only. He neither pleaded (as was done 
in the case before this court) nor offere·d proof (as was 
done in the case before this court) of a claim in quantum 
meruit. At the close of all the evidence the trial 0ourt 
took the case under advisement and thereafter adjudged 
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover in qua;ntum 
meruit. The supreme court reversed because the defend-
ant had no notice whatsoever of a claim for the reason-
able value of the plaintiff's services. The court distin-
gUished and cited with approval Morris v. Russell (Utah, 
19:51) 236 P. 2d 451, wherein the plaintiff pleaded, as was 
done in the case before this court, a claim for recovery 
on an express contract and a claim for recovery in 
quantum meruit and the court held that the, plaintiff 
was entitled to recover in quantum meruit. 
2. The evidence was 'Sufficient to support the ver-
dict of th·e jury in favor of respondent for the 
recovery on an implied promise of the rea.s·on-
able value of respondent's services rendered at 
decedent's special instance and request. 
Appellant's argument on this issue is addressed 
solely to conflicting inferences that were resolved by the 
jury in favor of respondent. The inferences are drawn 
by appellant from a purported quotation of isolra:ted bits 
of testimony that is not supported by the record. Appel-
lant asserts that the issue before this court is whether 
Mrs. L·ovett and Mrs. Giesy reasonably contemplated 
that Mrs. Lovett would be paid for her services, or 
whether the services would reasonably be interpreted 
as a gratuity. Appellant then states that the eviden~ce does 
not show circumstances from which a promise to pay 
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could reasonably be inferred. (Appellant's brief, pp. 17-
22.) 
T'he issue before this court is whether or not there 
was any substantial evidence to support the verdict of 
the jury. We submit the matter on the record set forth 
above, p. 4, et seq., with the following additional com-
ments. One does not engage in employment an average 
in excess of six hours a day for thirty-three months 
doing the following work: domestic work consisting of 
preparing meals, washing dishes, washing and polishing 
floors, laundering clothing, washing windows, and the 
general household duties of a large apartment; beauty 
work -consisting of washing and tinting hair, giving 
facials and manicuring nails an average ·of in excess of 
once each week; correspondence work consisting of read-
ing and writing mail, taking care of accounts and writing 
checks; and, personal work consisting of the care of the 
person of another, without both parties contemplating 
that the service·s will be paid for in money. This is par-
ticularly true where a person in the position of Mrs. 
Lovett was specifically asked to take over the duties of a 
former domestic employee and was repeatedly told that 
she need not be concerned about payment for her services 
because she would be well paid. The evidence in this 
case is that Mrs. Lovett's services were worth the rea-
sonable value of $1.2'5 to $1.50 per hour (R. 78). Com-
puted at that rate over a period of thirty-three months 
at an average of six hours per day, Mrs. Lovett's services 
were reasonably worth between two and three times the 
amount of the $3,300.00 claim that she presented in pro-
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bate. We submit that the verdict of the jury was amply 
supported by the evidence. 
POINT III. 
·THE INSTR.UCTIONS, AS GIVEN DID NOT 
PLACE THE BURDEN ON APPELLANT ·OF NEGA-
TIVING A GIF'T OF' THE LARGE DIAMOND RING 
(EX. 1) THAT WAS. THE SUBJEC.T OF APPEL-
LANT''S COUNTERCLAIM. 'THE INS·TRUC'TIONS 
DID NO'T PRE·JUDICE APPELLANT. 
Appellant claims that Instruction No. 3 placed the 
burden on ap·p·ellant of negativing a gift of the large dia-
mond ring that was the subject of ap·p·ellant's counter-
claim. 
1. Instruction No. 3 read as follows: 
"·The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence, as that term is 
hereinafter defined, the allegations of the 2nd 
cause of action of said complaint, as the same are 
set forth in Instruction No. 1; and the burden is 
upon the defendant to so prove the allegatiovns of 
its counter-claim} as the same are set forth in In-
struction No. 2. " ( R. 168.) (Italics added.) 
Instruction No. 2 (R. 166) set forth the allegations of 
appellant's counterclain1, which were in the ordinary form 
of a complaint in replevin, and alleged ownership and 
right to possession of the large diamond ring in Mrs. 
Giesy pTior to her death, right to possession in the exe-
cutor as h·er successor, a demand on Mrs. Lovett and re-
fusal. ·The burden was on appellant to prove a prima 
facie case in replevin, as set forth in Instruction No.2 and 
3, hy p·roving original ownership and right to possession 
in Mrs. Giesy, right to possession in the executor a:s her 
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successor and a de-mand and refusal. R·espondent admit-
ted those facts by proving that Mrs. Giesy purchased the 
ring from her own funds in December of 1950 (R. 42, 89-
91), by adn1itting that appellant was executor of her es-
tate (R. 1) and proving a demand by the executor (Ex. 
15, R. 108, 113) and withholding of the ring by respond-
ent (Ex. 16, R .. 111, 113). Supra,, p. 10 et seq. 
It then became the burden of respondent to prove 
by elear and convincing evidence that Mrs. Giesy gave the 
large diamond ring to her. This burden on respondent 
was amply covered by Instructions No. 6A and 9, which 
were not in conflict with Instruction No. 3. Instruction 
No. 6A read as follows : 
''The plaintiff, Mrs. Lovett, claim'S she owns 
each of the items of jewelry in this case because, 
she claims, the jewelry was given to her by Mrs. 
Giesy. You are instructed that a person who 
claims ownership of property by gift has the bur-
den of proving each of the elements of gift by 
clear and convincing evid:ence. 
"If you do not find that all of these elements of a 
gift to Mrs. Lovett have been proved by clear 
and convincing evidence, it would be your duty to 
find in favor of the defendant and against the 
plaintiff." (R. 172.) (Italics added.) 
In Instruction No. 9 the court instructed the jury that 
the intention of the donor to make a gift must be shown 
by the evidence to be clear and unmistakable (R. 175). 
The instructions, when read as a whole as required by 
Instruction No. 13 ( R. 179), did not place the burden on 
appellant to negative a gift of the large diamond ring. 
They did place the burden on respondent to prove the 
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gift by clear and convincing evidence. 
2. The instructions as given could not possibly have 
prejudiced ~appellant. The uncontradicted testimony of 
respondent's witnesses (R. 89-91, R. 43-4·6), the uncontra-
dicted written evidence in Mrs. Giesy's own handwriting 
(Ex. 2) and appellant's own evidence (Dr. David E. 
Smith, R. 11H-120) showed conclusively that Mrs. Giesy 
did give the large diamond ring to Mrs. Lovett. Appel-
lant offered no evidence to the contrary. We submit that 
the evidence is conclusive that Mrs. Giesy gave Mrs. 
Lovett the ring and that ·as a matter of law Mrs. Lovett 
is entitled to the ring as against appellant's counter-
claim. The instructions could not, therefore, have prej-
udiced appellant. 
POINT IV. 
T'HE INSTRUCTION'S A·S GIVEN WERE 
NOT· A MISSTATEMENT OF THE LAW PERTAIN-
ING TO DE.LIVERY OF· ·THE GIF!T OF JEWELRY 
(EXS. 3-11, EXCEPT EX. 6) T'HAT WAS THE SUB-
JECT O·F· R·ES.P·ONDENT'S· FIRST CAUSE OF1 AC-
TION. THE INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT PREJUDICE 
APPELLANT·. 
The second paragraph of Instruction No. 6 reads 
as follows: 
"If you believe ~and find from the evidence 
that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in question 
to plaintiff, or authorized or directed Mrs. Mad-
docks to deliver th·e jewelry to plaintiff, with the 
intent that the jewelry was to go to and belong 
to plaintiff as her own p~roperty, then you are in-
structed that a valid gift of the jewelry was made 
to plaintiff and on this issue your verdict must be 
In favor of plaintiff and against defendant on 
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plaintiff's first cause of action." (R. 171.) 
1. Appellant claims that Instruction No. 6 was er-
roneous in that under the instruction the jury could have 
found that delivery to Mrs. Maddocks was a sufficient 
delivery to constitute a completed gift without delivery 
of the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, the donee, appellant's brief, 
pp. 24-25. We submit that under the instructions as given 
the jury could not have found that delivery to Mrs. Mad-
docks was a sufficient delivery to constitute a completed 
gift. The instructions by their express terms and by nec-
essary implication did require that the jury find that the 
jewelry was in fact delivered to Mrs. Lovett by Mrs. 
Giesy or by Mrs. Maddocks acting pursuant to Mrs. 
Giesy's authorization and direction. 
a. The clear import of Instruction No. 6, standing 
alone, was that the jury must find that the jewelry was 
in fact delivered to Mrs. Lovett by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs. 
Maddocks. The vvords, "If you believe and find from 
the evidence that Mrs. Giesy delivered the jewelry in 
question to plaintiff, * * *" in the, phrase, "If you believe 
and find fron1 the evidence that Mrs. Giesy delivered the 
jewelry in question to plaintiff, or authorized or directed 
~irs. Maddocks to deliver the jewelry to plaintiff, * * *'' 
are an express or necessarily implied instruction that 
~Irs. Giesy must have delivered the jewelry to Mrs. 
Lovett directly or that she must have done so indirectly 
through Mrs. Maddocks acting under her authorization 
and direction. 
b. Instruction No. 5 (R. 170) and Instruction No.6, 
when read as a part of a connected whole, required the 
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jury to believe that the jewelry was in fact delivered to 
Mrs. Lovett by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs. Maddocks acting 
under Mrs. Giesy''S authorization and direction. InstruC-
tion No. 6 required the jury to believe that Mrs. Giesy de-
livered the jewelry in question to Mrs. Lovett, or author-
ized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver the jewelry 
to Mrs. Lovett. Instruction No. 5 provided that, "De-
livery, as used in these instructions, means there must be 
an actual trarnsfer by the donor of the pDss·ession, domin-
ion and control of the property to the done.e. A m,anual 
transfer of the property by the owner, or by a person au-
thorized or directed to do so by the owner to the d:onee, is 
a sufficient delivery, as that term is used and defined in 
these instructions." (Italics added.) Instruction No.5 re-
quired the jury to believe that there was an actual trans-
fer of possession, dominion and control of the property, 
to the donee by the donor, or by the person authorized or 
directed to do so by the donor, and Instruction No. 6 re-
quired the jury to believe that Mrs. Giesy delivered the 
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, or authorized or directed Mrs. 
Maddocks to do so. The only reasonable interpretation 
of the two instructions when read together is that the 
jury was required to find that there was an actual trans-
fer of possession, dominion and control of the property 
to Mrs. Lovett as donee by Mrs. Giesy or by Mrs. Mad-
docks acting under Mrs. Giesy's authorization and direc-
tion. 
2. App·ellant also asserts that Instruction No. 6 is 
erroneous because under the instruction the jury was not 
required to believe that delivery to respondent was ever 
intended by Mrs. Giesy to be completed, appellant's brief, 
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pp. 24-25. We submit that appellant's contention is not 
correct. Instruction No. 6 expressly provided that Mrs. 
Giesy must have delivered the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett, "or 
authorized or directed Mrs. Maddocks to deliver the 
jewelry to Mrs. Lovett with the intent that the jewelry 
go to and belong to Mrs. L·ovett as her own property.'' 
Instruction No. 5 provided that delivery meant that there 
must have been an actual transfer of possession, dominion 
and control of the subject matter of the gift to the donee 
by the donor or by a person authorized or direeted to do 
so by the donor. Both Instruction No. 6, standing alone, 
and the instructions as a whole, expressly required that 
the jury find that Mrs. Giesy intended the jewelry to be 
delivered to Mrs. Lovett. 
3. The instructions as given could not possibly have 
prejudiced appellant. The admitted facts of the case 
were that the jewelry was in fact delivered to Mrs. 
Lovett. Respondent's and appellant's own witnesses testi-
fied that the jevvelry was delivered to Mrs. Lovett. Re-
spondent's vvitnesses testified that Mrs. Maddocks de-
livered the jewelry to Mrs. Lovett at the apartment pur-
suant to Mrs. Giesy's authorization. Respondent's wit-
nesses further testified that, when Mrs. Giesy thereafter 
was informed at the hospital that the jewelry had been de-
livered to Mrs. Lovett, Mrs. Giesy told Mrs. Lovett not 
to turn the jewelry over to the executor, that the jewelry 
was Mrs. Lovett's and that she wanted Mrs. Lovett to 
have it. See testimony of Mrs. Maddocks (R. 79-84) and 
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testimony of Mr. Lovett (R. 48-52'). Dr. David E. Smith, 
appellant''S own witness, testified that Mrs. Giesy told 
him ~at the apartment that she was going to turn the 
jewelry over to Mrs. LOivett and that thereafter at the 
hospital Mrs. Gie:sy told him that she had delivered the 
jewelry to Mrs. LoiVett (R. 117-124). The evidence is un-
disputed that Mrs. Lovett had possession of the jewelry 
immediately following Mrs. Giesy's death. The only ques-
tion in the case was whether the jewelry was delivered 
to Mrs. Lovett for safekeeping or as a gift, and that 
question was clearly covered by Instructions No. 6, 6A 
and 9, in which the court charged the jury that the in-
tention of the donor to make a gift must be shown by .the 
evidence to he clear and unmistakable. 
Resp~ectfully submitted, 
McBROOM & HANNI, 
Attorneys for Respondent. 
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